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Entrepreneurs are drivers for economic prosperity and innovation. They take risks that 
are normally avoided by established companies, pushing industry boundaries to the 
next level. Several incubation mechanisms emerged in order to support new ventures 
in coping with initial challenges. Accelerators were born in 2005 and completely 
revolutionized how business incubation is done. By offering knowledge intensive and 
specialized support, acceleration programs aim to speed up new ventures´ 
development in approximately three months. Scholars have studied this new 
incubation mechanism over the last years but still little is known about the impact that 
accelerators have on startups. In order to address this research gap, we interviewed ten 
accelerated startups to understand the entrepreneurs´ perspective about the program. 
Based on acknowledged research, we investigated the impact of accelerators on the 
drivers of startup success. Literature divides the drivers in four main categories – 
Team, Product, Marketing and Financials.  
We found accelerators to be remarkable Team Builders for accelerated startups. Due 
to the cohort effect and the knowledge-sharing environment promoted by accelerators, 
ventures develop their Team Personality and Credibility throughout the program. 
Additionally, we found that accelerators are great Market Development Champions 
for high-tech startups. Our results suggest that the accelerators´ market-oriented mind-
set positively impact all the drivers of startup success of the Marketing category. 
 









Os empreendedores são motores para o desenvolvimento económico e inovação. Eles 
correm riscos que são normalmente evitados pelas grandes empresas, desafiando os 
limites pré-estabelecidos pela indústria. Vários mecanismos de incubação surgiram 
para ajudar as novas empresas a enfrentar os seus primeiros desafios. Os aceleradores 
emergiram em 2005 e revolucionaram a forma como a incubação de novas empresas 
é feita. Através de um suporte especializado e baseado no conhecimento, os 
aceleradores têm como objetivo acelerar o desenvolvimento de novos negócios em 
aproximadamente três meses. Os académicos têm estudado este novo mecanismo de 
incubação durante os últimos anos, mas pouco se descobriu acerca do impacto que os 
aceleradores têm nas startups. De forma a preencher esta lacuna, foram entrevistadas 
dez startups previamente aceleradas para perceber a perspetiva dos empreendedores 
sobre o programa. Baseados em investigação reconhecida, indagamos o impacto dos 
aceleradores nos drivers de sucesso das startups. A literatura divide os drivers em 
quarto categorias principais – Equipa, Produto, Marketing e Financeiro. 
Concluímos que os aceleradores são um fantástico suporte ao Desenvolvimento de 
Equipa das startups aceleradas. Devido ao efeito cohort e ao ambiente de partilha do 
conhecimento promovido pelo acelerador, as empresas desenvolvem a sua 
Personalidade e Credibilidade enquanto equipa. Adicionalmente, descobrimos que os 
aceleradores prestam um grande apoio no Desenvolvimento de Mercado para as high-
tech startups. Os nossos resultados sugerem que o pensamento orientado para o 
mercado dos aceleradores é responsável por um impacto positivo em todos os drivers 
de sucesso das startup, relativamente à categoria Marketing. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1. Background and Problem Statement 
Entrepreneurs are responsible for bringing disruption to established industries. They 
completely change the game as we used to play it, forcing incumbents to adapt to new 
realities. LinkedIn has completely reshaped the recruitment business, while Airbnb 
allows ordinary people to rent out their residences as tourist accommodation. Uber is 
a digital platform that connects passengers with drivers and is disrupting the taxi 
industry, forcing it to redesign this long-lasting business model (Siegele 2014). 
Entrepreneurship is a crucial driver for economic prosperity and innovation. By 
literally betting on new products and technological innovations, entrepreneurs are 
willing to take risks that are usually avoided by established companies (Clarysse, 
Wright and VanHove 2015). Startups challenge the status quo and push the boundaries 
further, instigating competition and industry innovation (Audretsch and Keilbach 
2008). Literature suggests that entrepreneurship has a remarkable impact on 
innovation and employment, which ultimately lead to the economic development of a 
certain region or population (Galindo and Méndez 2014). As reported by the Kauffman 
foundation, newly formed startups create on average three million new jobs annually 
in the United States. Nevertheless, the large majority of these new startups fail or 
remain stagnated after a short period of time (Morelix, Reedy and Russell 2016).  
Extant research reveals that startups face key challenges when trying to cope with the 
“liability of newness”. Limited financial resources are a main driver for startup failure 
and in many cases, newly created ventures have to delay their growth due to the lack 
of timely funds (Davila, Foster and Gupta 2003). Founding team inexperience and lack 
of knowledge on how to seize and follow business opportunities are also major 
challenges for young startups when trying to compete with other resourceful 
companies (Gruber, MacMillan and Thompson 2008; Ambos and Birkinshaw 2010). 
In order to support and guide entrepreneurs on their first steps, several institutions have 
emerged such as incubators, business angels, venture capital firms and accelerators. 
Of particular importance due to its novelty and already proved impact are the 
accelerators (Cohen 2013).  
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The first accelerator emerged in 2005 in the United States as a response to the 
stagnation of previous incubation models, which are mainly focused on providing 
office space and some general business support services (Bruneel, Ratinho, Clarysse 
and Groen 2012). The main goal for an accelerator is to accelerate a new venture 
development process. By focusing on intangible, knowledge intensive and specialized 
support services, the accelerator offers a program that provides education, mentoring 
and a network of important economic agents from the entrepreneurial and venture 
capital ecosystems (Cohen and Hochberg 2014). Miller and Bound (2011) enumerate 
five main features that differentiate the accelerator’s incubation model from other 
approaches:  
• An application process that is open to all, yet highly competitive. 
• Provision of pre-seed investment, usually in exchange for equity. 
• A focus on small teams not individual founders. 
• Time-limited support comprising programmed events and intensive mentoring and 
networking. 
• Cohorts or ‘classes’ of startups rather than individual companies.” 
Notwithstanding of its novelty and innovative approach, acceleration programs are 
steadily growing around the world. Seed-DB, a centralized databased on seed 
accelerators, reported more than 213 accelerators worldwide in 2013, and 
approximately 3 800 accelerated ventures (Pauwels, Clarysse, Wright and Van Hove 
2016). Y Combinator, considered to lead acceleration programs, is responsible for two 
of the most high-growth tech companies from the last decade, Dropbox and Airbnb. 
Furthermore, in 2011, Yuri Milner and Ron Conway made an across-the-board 
investment of $150 000 in every single startup from the Y Combinator cohort in 
Mountain View (Miller and Bound 2011). These evidences highlight the growth and 
impact of accelerators on the entrepreneurial and investors ecosystems.  
The raise of acceleration programs is strongly correlated with the drop on 
experimentation costs faced by tech start-ups (Pauwels et al. 2016). Comparing to the 
early 2000s, new era digital businesses face extremely lower hardware and software 
development costs. For instance, in 2011, hosting one gigabyte per month cost less 
than $0.16 under the Amazon Web Services. Eleven years earlier, hosting costs were 
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approximately $19 per gigabyte, meaning that storage capacity costs have dropped 
more than one hundred times in one decade (Miller and Bound 2011).  
Inspite of its importance, literature on how accelerators shape the trajectories of new 
ventures is still scarce. In an important study, Smith and Hannigan (2015) compared 
the impact of receiving funds from a top angel investor relative to a top accelerator. 
The results indicate that going through a top acceleration program increases the speed 
of exit either by acquisition or quitting. Furthermore, accelerators also enhance the 
likelihood of follow-on financing, mainly in the period following “demo-day” (Smith 
and Hannigan 2015). Nevertheless, more research is need to fully understand the 
impact of accelerators on new venture development (Cohen and Hochberg 2014). The 
few available studies are largely descriptive in nature and fail in understanding what 
business dimensions are in fact accelerated and how does the acceleration process 
takes place (Cohen and Hochberg 2014; Miller and Bound 2011). Therefore, the 
purpose for this thesis is to understand how acceleration programs affect ventures 
development.  
To assess the accelerators’ impact, we will investigate whether ventures that 
participate in an accelerator program actually felt accelerated, and if so, how and why. 
More specifically, we will focus on finding evidence of the accelerators’ impact on the 
key drivers of startup success. Previous studies have tried to identify which variables 
might be in the origin of a startup success (MacMillan et al. 1985; Song, Di Benedetto 
and Song 2010). Scholars identified a set of comparable indicators to predict startups 
performance and have considered four major categories – the startup’s team, its 
product, the market they want to address and the financial projections (Song, Di 
Benedetto and Song 2010). Accelerators offer a wide range of mentoring and 
educational services, but little is known on how this activities contribute for ventures’ 
development (Cohen and Hochberg 2014). Accelerated ventures’ perspectives on the 
topic have been neglected in previous research, so this thesis will explore 
entrepreneurs’ thoughts and feelings about the phenomenon. 
 
2. Aims and Scope 
This thesis will focus on how acceleration programs affect ventures’ development and 
learning. The aim is to understand which key drivers of startup success, if any, are in 
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fact accelerated and developed during the process. By uncovering entrepreneurs’ 
perspectives, we will investigate what is the contribution of accelerators on the 
ventures’ early development. 
RQ1: What do entrepreneurs expect from acceleration programs? 
RQ2: Do ventures feel accelerated after the program? 
RQ3: Do accelerators have any impact on the drivers of startup success? If so, which 
are the most impacted ones?  
 
3. Research Methods 
Having into account the lack of background theory on the topic, the present study will 
be based on a multiple case-study research method. Several authors consider case-
studies to be the most expeditious method to set up an exploratory research (Eisenhardt 
1989; Yin 2009). Furthermore, it allows to retain the meaningful characteristics of a 
real-life phenomenon, especially when the researcher has no control over the studied 
event (Yin 2009). Our multiple case-study method took the form of semi-structured 
interviews with ten graduated startups from the Building Global Innovators 
acceleration program. Based on an inductive method, we extracted extremely 
meaningful outcomes from the interviews and we present them in detail on the fourth 
chapter of the present dissertation. 
 
4. Relevance 
Our study will bring valuable information to the people, institutions and policy makers 
that might be interested in the entrepreneurship phenomenon.   
First, we will help entrepreneurs to better understand how it is to be accelerated. Our 
research will be based on startups that come to leave their testimonies about the impact 
of being accelerated. Entrepreneurs can take valuable inputs in order to understand if 
accelerators offer the service they want and need.  
Second, accelerators will be able to finally understand how their programs are 
affecting the ventures’ development process. Literature have studied the acceleration 
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programs’ structure and composition, but little is known about its impact (Cohen and 
Hochberg 2014). By addressing this gap, we will provide accelerators with valuable 
information that they can use to make adjustments to redefine the program’s impact. 
Additionally, our work also gives important contributions to other incubation models. 
We will further prove if accelerator specific mechanisms in fact accelerate startups’ 
development process and, if so, which specific dimensions are impacted the most. 
Other incubation models can possibly incorporate some of the accelerators’ practices 
if they want to achieve similar results. 
Third, Policy Makers can find results very insightful for the investment decision-
making process. Literature suggest that regions with a high level of entrepreneurship 
capital are expected to reach higher levels of economic growth and lower levels of 
unemployment rate (Audretsch and Keilbach 2008). Through our research, Policy 
Makers will be better informed whether accelerators are a good investment option or 
not. We will provide results on the impact of accelerators on startups so that 
comparison between other methods of promoting entrepreneurial activity will be easier 
to do after this study. 
 
5. Dissertation Outline 
Our research is followed by a careful analysis of the literature review on accelerators, 
entrepreneurial learning and drivers for startup success. The third chapter presents the 
chosen research methodology to conduct our investigation. Additionally, a description 
of our sample is also included in this section. Results are presented and discussed in 
the fourth chapter. Finally, our dissertation’s last chapter addresses our study’s 









CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Accelerators – a new incubation model 
Several institutions and individuals are currently taking an active role on supporting 
entrepreneurial ideas all around the world. Of particular importance are incubators, 
angel investors and accelerators. This research will focus on the accelerators’ impact 
and how it contributes to ventures’ early success.  
1.1. History Overview 
The first accelerator, Y Combinator, was founded in 2005 in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, by Paul Graham. The second (first competitor), Techstars, appeared in 
2007, in Boulder Colorado, has now around 50 franchises worldwide. Many other 
accelerators followed, including Dreamit in Philadelphia, Seedcamp in London, and 
Launchbox Digital in Washington DC. Literature suggests that since 2005, over 6000 
startups have participated in one of the existent 650 programs (United States) and 
collectively raised $13B in capital (Hallen, Bingham and Cohen 2016). Several 
participants have experimented enormous growth, as it is the case of AirBnB, Digital 
Ocean and Dropbox (Miller and Bound 2011). Accelerators firstly centred efforts on 
the information-technology industry due to its high-growth potential and minimum 
initial capital required to operate and develop. Nowadays, many accelerators have 
become more industry profiled. For instance, Fintech Innovation Lab focuses 
exclusively on the financial sector, while L’Accélérateur is more retail-oriented 
(Pauwels et al. 2016). Even though Accelerators often advertise themselves as 
institutions that steadily develop startups and businesses, there is surprisingly little 
research on their contribution and added-value. The available studies are descriptive 
in nature, lacking a consistent theoretical background to study the phenomenon (Cohen 
and Hochberg 2014; Miller and Bound 2011). 
 
1.2. The program in detail 
Accelerators help startups to build the initial product and to secure resources like seed 
capital, employees and working space. These features are common among other 
programs offered by incubators or angel investors. Additionally, accelerators offer a 
plethora of networking, educational seminars and mentorship programs (Cohen 2013). 
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Mentors might be successful entrepreneurs, angel investors, or even corporate 
executives.  
“A fixed-term, cohort-based program, including mentorship and educational 
components, that culminates in a public pitch event or demo-day.” Susan G. Cohen 
The limited duration is one of the key features that sets acceleration programs apart 
from other incubation models. It takes roughly three months for a project to be 
considered a failure or a success. Regardless of the outcome, the acceleration process 
goal is to allow startups to interact as fast as they can within their markets, with the 
ultimate challenge of learning and re-adapt ideas quickly. Even if the project fails, it 
is better to fail in three months than in three years because it allows entrepreneurs to 
re-allocate their own resources to other projects. Most of the programs end with a 
“demo day”, where ventures pitch to a large audience of qualified investors (Cohen 
2013).  
The first stage starts with a rigorous and carefully selection process. An open call is 
put in place for a period of time where any startup can apply online on a specific 
software platform. There are some programs, such as Startupbootcamp and Climate-
KIC, which start scouting start-ups even before the application period (Pauwels et al. 
2016). An investment opportunity is then offered to the selected venture. Literature 
suggests that 8 out of 13 accelerator programs offer a small amount of financing in 
return for equity, tipically ranging from $3.600 to $50.000, for 3–10% equity (Pauwels 
et al. 2016). During the program, the accelerator offers a curriculum program that 
covers a diversity of topics such as finance, marketing and general management. In 
addition, ventures can book weekly office hours which are intended to provide 
steadfast assistance in order to accelerate the business development. Nevertheless, 
existing body research suggests mentoring as the most revolutionary acceleration 
program’s feature (Cohen 2013). Mentoring aims to help ventures in defining their 
business models and to stimulate the procurement of possible partners, customers and 
investors. Literature advocates that even though variations exist in some acceleration 
programs, mentoring services are evident and take a major role across all the 





2. Entrepreneurial Learning 
Every new venture faces unpredictable events. However, it is the entrepreneur’s ability 
to overcome and learn from adversity that determines future success or failure (Minniti 
and Bygrave 2001; Deakins 1996). Accelerators are important because they aim to 
help ventures in the learning process, avoiding costly even fatal mistakes.  
Academics have yet to agree to a single definition of Entrepreneurial learning (EL). 
Several authors focus on the realization of the opportunity and the capability to act and 
mobilize the required resources to materialize that vision (Rae 2005). Young and 
Sexton (2003), broadly define EL as the experiential and cognitive processes affected 
to acquire, retain and materialize the entrepreneurial knowledge. We want to focus our 
analyses on what entrepreneurs learn after envisioning an entrepreneurial opportunity. 
Hereafter, we will use  Stevenson and Jarillo (1990, p. 23) definition of EL, as the 
learning that occurs during the entrepreneurial process, which can be seen as the 
process by which individuals or organizations pursue entrepreneurial opportunities by 
allocating new resources and knowledge. Entrepreneurial opportunities lacks a 
coherent and clear definition (Busenitz et al. 2003). Academia have recognized and 
vastly cited Eckhardt and Shane’s (2003, p.336) definition of the concept, describing 
entrepreneurial opportunities as situations in which new processes, products or 
services are introduced or modified through the unfolding of new means, ends, or 
means-ends relationships. Stevenson and Jarillo (1990), suggest two different types of 
opportunities on a business and entrepreneurial level, opportunity exploration and 
opportunity exploitation. Opportunity exploration (also discovery, recognition, or 
development), concerns the search for information leading to the creation of new 
knowledge (Alvarez and Busenitz 2001), while opportunity exploitation entails a firm 
to commit previously owned resources and knowledge, in order to build efficient 
business systems to upscale current operations and production to obtain returns from 
the exploitation of the new product arising from the opportunity (Choi and Shepherd 
2004). 
2.1. Entrepreneurial Learning dimensions 
Wang and Chugh (2014) have identified three different learning dimensions that can 
occur during the entrepreneurial process: i) individual and collective learning; ii) 
exploratory and exploitative learning; iii) intuitive and sense making learning. 
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2.1.1. Individual and Collective learning 
Individual learning is described as the process in which individuals acquire data, 
information, skill or knowledge. Collective learning is a process of acquiring 
information and knowledge in group, and can be defined as a “social process of 
cumulative knowledge, based on a set of shared rules and procedures which allow 
individuals to coordinate their actions in search for problem solutions” (Capello 1999, 
p.354). 
2.1.2. Exploratory and Exploitative Learning 
The second dimension concerns exploratory and exploitative learning. Exploratory 
learning increases performance variance and is about questioning what it is currently 
done, while exploitative learning is about improving efficiency, mean performance 
and decreasing variance (McGrath 2001). March (1991, p.71) describes: exploration 
involves “search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, [and] 
discovery”. On the other hand, exploitation entails “refinement, choice, production, 
efficiency, selection, implementation, [and] execution.”   
2.1.3. Intuitive and Sense making learning 
Finally, the third learning dimension is composed by sense making and intuitive 
learning. The first entails learning by knowing the reality while the second is abstract 
and more difficult to understand how it develops (Felder and Silverman 1988). Sense 
making learners are considered to use a more logical and practical approach to discover 
an opportunity, understanding and analysing the existent relationships of market 
conditions. Reversely, intuitive learners are more likely to create a new opportunity 
based on a high level of conceptual and abstract thinking, which is considered to be 
more difficult to be explained on a structured and logical format. Bingham and Davis 
(2012, p.613) describe intuitive learning as improvisational learning – “a real-time 
learning process in which firms learn to solve unexpected problems or capturing 
surprising opportunities in the moment”. 
 
2.2. How do acceleration programs stimulate entrepreneurial learning? 
Learning is widely mentioned as a critical success factor during the entrepreneurial 
process (Minniti and Bygrave 2001; Deakins 1996). Entrepreneurs face a major 
challenge when trying to cope with initial stage distress, particularly when the 
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interpretation of the problem lacks relevant knowledge. Accelerators attempt to 
mitigate these risks by promoting an intensive indirect learning environment based on 
the knowledge and advices of others (Hallen et al. 2016). Indirect learning differs from 
direct learning as this last one requires learning from own experiences (Schwab 2007). 
Conversely, indirect learning concerns learning from others’ experience (Ingram 
2002).  
Throughout acceleration programs, startup cohorts receive several formal and informal 
indirect learning classes. Formal indirect learning takes place through a set of 
functional seminars in topics such as marketing, finance, law and other technical 
matters like product development, web designing or programming. External or Alumni 
entrepreneurs are also invited as guest speakers, to discuss their own entrepreneurial 
journey – how they dealt with initial stage obstacles and dilemmas, or even how they 
are able to translate customer feedback into useful information within their businesses. 
Nevertheless, the most relevant tool used to provide an intensive indirect learning 
ecosystem to new ventures, is considered to be the fast paced and carefully planned 
mentorship program (Hallen et al. 2016). 
New ventures discuss with their mentors topics regarding customer development, 
financial and operational structures and built a “go-to-market” strategy. Interactions 
with experienced mentors are aimed to fulfil perceived and unperceived business 
model gaps as fast as possible, with the minimum associated cost (Hallen et al. 2016). 
Seedcamp, a relevant European accelerator, claims that through its program, ventures 
are able to “tap into a global network of the right advisors and overcome the challenges 
you'll face in the fastest possible time” (Hallen et al. 2016). However, literature does 
not share a common view on the topic. The accelerators advisors’ approach goes 
against to what several authors consider to be an extremely important learning engine, 
the trial-and-error experimentation (Gavetti and Rivkin 2007; Ries 2011). 
New ventures face a challenge on which way to learn. On one hand, new ventures 
which seek to overcome obstacles and test assumptions through trial-and-error 
experiments, may acquire and retain knowledge in a much more effective way because 
learning process takes place through first-hand experiments (Gavetti and Rivkin 2007; 
Ries 2011). On the other, limited resources and the amount of time and capital required 
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to constantly try and redefine a business model, may lead a new venture to premature 
failure (Beckman and Haunschild 2002; Hallen et al. 2016). 
 
3. Drivers for Startup success 
Past research reveals that early stage success of a new venture has a positive correlation 
with its probability of future success. Song et al. (2010) study reveals that only 14.25% 
of ventures that failed in their first product, have experienced success afterwards. 
Given the lack of resources, startups suffer from “liabilities of newness” (Schoonhoven 
et al. 1990) and find themselves in a much more risky situation than established 
companies. Newly created ventures normally pursue an “all eggs in one basket” 
strategy, concentrating all their financial resources in one product, rather than splitting 
the investment between different products like experienced and resourceful companies 
do (Feeser and Willard 1990). 
Considering the importance of startups early success for both entrepreneurial and 
investors’ communities, scholars have investigated key drivers of startup success. 
Several authors have studied what might be in the origin for a startup to succeed or fail 
and four major drivers emerged from research – the startup team, marketing expertise, 
product characteristics and financial plans (Song et al. 2010). Bearing in mind the 
scarce literature on which criteria are actually helpful in distinguishing successful from 
unsuccessful new ventures, our study also add the investors’ community perspective 
on the topic. MacMillan et al. (1985) studied the venture capitalists’ investment criteria 
when analysing a new venture. The results presented six major groups composing the 
decision-making process: i) entrepreneur’s personality; ii) entrepreneur’s experience; 
iii) product characteristics; iv) market characteristics; v) financial projections; vi) 
venture team composition. Furthermore, Song et al. (2008) conducted a meta-analysis 
regarding the success factors in new ventures and grouped twenty-four metafactors 
into three categories – the entrepreneurial team, market opportunity (marketing and 
product) and resources (financial and technical expertise). Considering the congruence 
between previous research on the topic, we divided the drivers of a startup success into 
four major building blocks: i) team; ii) product; iii) marketing; iv) financials. We will 




Given the low access to resources, the human capital is considered to be the unique 
key differentiator of early stage ventures (Colombo and Grilli 2010). Additionally, a 
Kauffman Foundation study (2007) reported team characteristics as the most relevant 
criterion for an investor to support a new venture. Previous research highlights the 
importance of the jockey (entrepreneur) over the horse (product), horse race (market) 
or even the odds (financials) to determine whether an investor is willing to place a bet 
or not (MacMillan et al. 1985). Initial business concept might change during the 
process but the human capital is the only resource that will stand until the end of the 
journey (Zhao et al. 2015).  
Delmar and Shane (2006) have found previous startup experience to be a positive 
predictor of new venture performance. Experienced entrepreneurs have more tools and 
accumulated knowledge that can be applied to subsequent projects. Furthermore, 
Marion (2016) conducted a research on ten years of data from venture capital firm 
First Round, and found that founders’ experience on a top tech company and education 
at a top school, leverage the probability of a startup to succeed. Soft-skills such as the 
ability to communicate or to be coachable, meaning the ability to understand and 
incorporate different perspectives, are also high-valuable indicators for startup’s future 
success (MacMillan et al. 1985). For Song et al. (2010, 2011), a startup team equipped 
with strong management capabilities and technical expertise is much more qualified 
to cope with the “liabilities of newness”. 
Two Team sub-categories emerge from literature. The first is Team Credibility, which 
is related with the hard-skills of a venture and entails previous experience and 
educational background, industry knowledge, technical expertise and management 
skills. The second is Team Personality which concerns teamwork, communication, 
team coachability and passion (MacMillan et al. 1985; Delmar and Shane 2006; Song 
et al. 2010, 2011; Zhao et al. 2015). 
 
3.2. Product 
The importance of product characteristics is far from being disregarded by scholars. 
Several authors contrast the team-first perspective, suggesting that the horse (product) 
is the best predicator of an early venture success (Kaplan, Sensoy and Strömberg 
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2009). Product differentiation is considered to be a sine qua non for new ventures to 
achieve superior market and financial performance (Henard and Szymanski 2001).  
Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1994) highlight that differentiated products provide better 
chances for customer satisfaction and thus loyalty for repeating purchases. However, 
it is not enough to be different. MacMillan et al. (1985) mention proprietary protection 
as a key feature to prevent early attacks from competitors, being also one of the most 
valuable product characteristic for investors. 
 
3.3. Marketing 
Several marketing activities and market characteristics have been identified in the 
management literature as critical for new ventures early success (Song et al. 2010). 
These usually includes market research activities, sales force and marketing plan 
development (Calantone and Di Benedetto 1988; Zhao et al. 2015). Additionally, 
previous studies suggest that market attractiveness is positively correlated with 
startups’ initial performance. An attractive market is considered to be a market that 
generates substantial profit and has a low competitive environment (MacMillan et al. 
1985; Song et al. 2010). Similarly, private investors view market opportunity as a key 
criterion in the investment decision-making process. They make vague marketing 
plans one of the reasons to reject support to the startups. Of particular importance is to 
be sure and to prove that the created product or service meets the customer needs in a 
superior way (Calantone and Di Benedetto 1988). Concluding, researchers’ 
community believe that market attractiveness, the marketing plan and the degree to 
which a product meets the customer needs, are three critical predictors of a new venture 
success (MacMillan et al. 1985; Feeney, Haines and Riding 1999). 
 
3.4. Financials 
The fourth cornerstone for a startup to achieve above-average performance is to have 
a carefully-developed financial plan. A thorough financial plan includes future 
profitability, liquidity and viability. Literature suggests that accuracy and realism are 
imperatives when designing a financial plan (Feeney et al. 1999; Maxwell et al. 2011). 
Firstly, it is critical for entrepreneurs to have a clear picture from the venture’s 
financial position. Secondly, it shows professionalism and reliability to external agents 




3.5. Analysed Drivers 
During the interviews analyse, we try to identify which drivers for startup success, if 
any, were the most impacted by the acceleration program. The analysed criteria applied 
to this investigation, are based on research of Song et al. (2008, 2010, 2011), 
MacMillan et al. (1985) and Feeser and Willard (1990). Bearing in mind the 
congruence between existing body research, we divided the criteria into four categories 
that are presented in Table 1: i) Team; ii) Product; iii) Market; iv) Financials. 
According to the previous theory, the higher the impact on each specific dimension, 
the higher the probability of startup success. 
Table 1 – Key Drivers of Startup Success 





Team has a strong academic background 
Entrepreneurial 
Experience 
Team has prior entrepreneurial experiences 
Industry 
Knowledge 
The team knows how does the particular 
industry works 
Management Team owns management skills 
Technical 
Expertise 





Easy to work with and able to understand 
different perspectives 
Communication Team knows how to communicate 
Passion Passion for the venture’s project 




Differentiation It is different from what is offered 
Protectability Difficult to copy 
Readiness The product is ready to be launched 
Marketing 
Customer Needs The product meets customer needs 
Market 
Attractiveness 
The targeted market has huge revenue 
potential, it is growing and has low 
competition 
Marketing Plan 
The venture has a clear and carefully 
designed Marketing Plan 
Financial 
Liquidity 
The project is expected to pay dividends 
quickly 
Profitability Huge profit expectations 
Realism 














CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
1. Research Design 
The purpose of the present dissertation is to understand if ventures feel accelerated 
after an acceleration process or not, and if so, which key drivers for startup success are 
the most impacted ones. For that, we will follow a multiple case-study research 
methodology based on interviews. 
1.1. Multiple Case-Study 
The present dissertation will follow a multiple case-study research design. Literature 
suggests case-study as the advisable research method for understanding a complex 
social phenomenon, allowing the investigator to retain the holistic and meaningful 
attributes of real-life events. Additionally, we followed the three basilar criterion for 
choosing the present methodology (Yin 2009). As the author suggests, case-study is 
the most suitable research approach when trying to answer to “how” and “why” 
questions. Additionally, this methodology prevails if the investigator has little or no 
control on the events and if the study is focused on a contemporary phenomenon within 
a real-life context (Yin 2009). Our investigation aims to study ventures’ acceleration 
processes in which we do not have any control over and our analysis will be based on 
the interaction between the accelerator and entrepreneurs.  
We opted for a multiple case-study strategy rather than a single one, because it 
provides a more reliable source of information and a stronger base for theory building 
(Yin 1994). Even though single case-studies can deeply analyse a complex real-life 
phenomenon (Siggelkow 2007), multiple case-studies create more robust propositions 
and validates the built theory through multiple empirical evidence (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007). According to Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), adding three case-
studies to a single one offers four times the analytic power and robustness for the 
developed theory. On the present dissertation, ten case-studies will be presented and 
deeply analysed. As suggested by Yin (2009), we present now our sampling, data 






We investigated ten acceleration processes from one top Portuguese accelerator, 
Building Global Innovators (BGI). It is important to mention that for confidentially 
reasons, we codified every startup represented in our sample with a given letter (from 
A to J). Our sample is represented down below in Table 2. 
Table 2 – Sample 






A Health Portugal 5th - Prototype 
B Health England 4th 2 years Idea 









































Portugal 2nd - Idea 
 
2.1 Portuguese entrepreneurial ecosystem 
The Portuguese entrepreneurial ecosystem has been rapidly evolving over the last 
decade. Both private and public sectors have adopted a proactive mind-set concerning 
the topic. The Portuguese Government developed important partnerships with 
international institutions such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
Harvard University, Carnegie Mellon University, just to name a few. Since 2006, 
approximately €300 million of public funds have been invested to support market-
oriented research within academic institutions and to foster collaboration with top-
notch international institutions (Carvalho 2015). According to the European 
Accelerator Report of 2015, Portuguese accelerators ranks third on the number of 
accelerated startups in 2015, with 156 ventures accelerated. Despite this remarkable 
achievement, data reveals that only €327 000 were invested on these accelerated 
ventures. This means that in terms of investment captured, the top four Portuguese 
accelerators (Beta-I, Fábrica de Startups, BGI and Startup Braga) rank sixteenth over 
twenty four listed countries (Brunet, Grof and Izquierdo 2015). Notwithstanding, the 
employed effort and investment from the Portuguese private and public sector is 
already bearing fruits. The world’s biggest event in technology and entrepreneurship, 
Web Summit, landed in Portugal in 2016 and will stay for three years. Portuguese 
accelerators have highly contributed to the exponential development of the national 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. In the present dissertation, we will focus on the BGI 
acceleration program. 
2.2 Building Global Innovators  
Born in 2010, Building Global Innovators (BGI) is an accelerator based in Lisbon 
(Portugal) and in Cambridge (Massachusetts, USA). It is a transnational initiative to 
promote local entrepreneurship growth and aims to develop high-tech startups under 
five years old, helping them to scale rapidly. The accelerator connects new ventures 
with a global networking of relevant economic agents, always promoting a global-
oriented mind-set. Of particular importance are the key strategic partnerships that BGI 
has been creating along the way. So far, top eight science and engineering universities 
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in Portugal compose the BGI’s academic partnership portfolio. Additionally, the 
accelerator was able to build an extremely valuable relationship with Caixa Capital, a 
state owned venture capital firm from Caixa Geral de Depósitos, which allows BGI to 
provide financial support to four ventures annually, up to €1 million in total per edition 
(Carvalho 2015). 
BGI have four main market vertical that represent the industries in which the 
accelerator is more focused on: (i) medical technologies & health IT, (ii) smart cities 
& industrial tech, (iii) enterprise IT & smart data and (iv) ocean economy (Carvalho 
2015). To date, six complete edition were held by the accelerator and a seventh one is 
running at the moment. A BGI report (2017) suggests that from 2010 now, BGI 
received 918 program applications from 54 different countries, created more than 700 
new jobs and accelerated 117 startups with a remarkable survival rate of 73%. 
BGI’s acceleration process starts in July, while the graduation takes place during the 
month of May or June of the following year. From sending the application to the 
graduation day, the whole cycle takes approximately one year. Startups undergo 
through three key phases: i) the selection phase, ii) the acceleration phase, and iii) the 
venture phase. The selection phase runs from March to May and BGI kicks-off with 
an international road show. During June, approximately fifty startups are invited for 
an interview and up to twenty-one are accepted into the acceleration phase. It is 
important to mention that unlike the majority of other accelerators, BGI does not 
provide startups any financial resources for traveling and accommodation. Even 
though no fee is charged for startups to participate in the program, selected teams 
receive no financial support for any expenditure they might have (Carvalho 2015). 
After the application process, selected ventures enter into the second phase of the 
program – the acceleration phase. Of particular importance are the three intensive 
training periods, the so called bootcamps, which are designed to improve 
entrepreneurs’ skillset on a variety of topics such as company creation, how to 
communicate (e.g., pitching to a potential client or investors) or even learn how to 
cope with challenging decision-making processes. During the bootcamps, teams have 
the opportunity to network with highly experienced mentors. The goal is to develop 
the go-to-market strategy, which is designed to be simpler than a business plan, yet 
extremely focused on the critical steps needed to reach the market in the best and 
fastest possible manner. In between the bootcamps, teams are supposed to work along 
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with their mentor on weekly deliverables, in order to keep the speedy pace. During the 
acceleration phase, ventures have three opportunities to present their idea to an 
audience of entrepreneurs, industry experts, researchers and most importantly 
investors. Pitching events are also called demo days. The first two demo days are held 
in Lisbon, while the last one takes place in Cambridge MIT, with an internationally 
influent panel of entrepreneurs and investors assisting. Upon graduation (May or 
June), BGI selects the most talented and committed startups to participate on the third 
phase (ventures phase). During the ventures phase, ad-hoc support is offered to the 
eight to twelve best alumni teams. BGI offers a twelve month catalyst program and an 
up to five years coaching support until ventures succeed, exit or fail (BGI 2017). BGI’s 
program is compiled in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 – BGI Acceleration Program 
 
3. Data collection 
Yin (2009) suggests two possible approaches for collecting data when dealing with a 
case-study research design: direct observation and interviews of the people involved 
in the studied event. The present dissertation adopted a semi-structured interviews data 
collection method with ten accelerated teams from BGI’s acceleration program. 
Considering the complexity of the phenomenon, interviews are a suitable technique as 
it allows the researcher to collect “relevant data”, meaning reliable primary source of 
data (Yin 2011).  
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Interviews can take two principal formats, structured interviews or qualitative 
interviews. Literature suggests that structured interviews are usually very well scripted 
and the flow should be very strict, not allowing the interviewer to explore any out-of-
script topic. On the other hand, when performing a qualitative interview, the 
interviewer should not have a questionnaire with a set of questions to be posed to the 
interviewee and it should follow a conversational mode rather than a question-answer 
format (Yin 2011). We opted to follow a semi-structured interview approach as it 
allows to directly address the relevant topics, but at the same time empower the 
interviewees to expand their own thoughts and feelings about other pertinent subjects. 
Bearing in mind the complexity of the event and the lack of common definitional 
background between the interviewer and interviewee, we follow the wisely 
recommendation from Rubin and Rubin (1995). The author recommends that the 
interviewer should be able to listening a lot during an interview, and listen is about “to 
hear the meaning of what is being said” (p. 7).  
Nonetheless, interviews also present some limitations and are not a completely 
unbiased source of data. As Yin (2009) suggests, interviews can suffer from response 
bias or reflexivity, meaning the interviewee can misrepresent the reality by saying 
what he or she thinks the interviewer wants to hear. However, interviews are still 
considered to be one of the most expeditious research methods to conduct an 
exploratory study (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007).  
In order to expand our sample, five master students (including the author of this 
dissertation) collected ten different interviews from BGI’s alumni accelerated startups. 
Interviews were conducted face-to-face, via Skype and phone calls. Details on 
interviews’ format and participants are presented in Appendix A: Interviews Details. 
In addition, we corroborated the most relevant pieces of information through other web 
sources such as BGI’s pitch tapes and reports, startups’ websites and LinkedIn. The 
interview script was developed to be the same for every single interview and can be 
found in Appendix B: Interview Guide. It covers four main topics: i) organizational 
factors, ii) interaction between the startups and the accelerator iii) interaction between 
the cohort and how it impacts entrepreneurial learning, and iv) demographics about 
the startups and teams. Interviewed startups’ demographics can be found in Appendix 
C: Ventures Demographics. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
In the present chapter, we present findings from the interviews and discuss their 
implications. We present results according to our three different research questions 
that this dissertation aims to address. The first block regards entrepreneurs’ 
expectations when applying for an acceleration process. Secondly, we present data that 
aims to understand if ventures feel accelerated after the program or not. Finally, the 
last dataset accesses the key drivers of startup success that have eventually been 
affected during the acceleration program. 
1. What do entrepreneurs expect from acceleration programs? 
Our first research question concerns the entrepreneurs’ expectations when joining the 
program. Our purpose was to understand what ventures expect from this novel 
incubation model and to access if expectations were aligned with the program’s 
structure. Results were very clear. Even though we found evidence that some ventures 
did not know what to expect from the acceleration program, most participants 
mentioned at least one of the following reasons: i) secure financial investment; ii) 
structure and develop their business idea. Ventures statements can be found in the 
Appendix D: Evidence on Expectations. 
Acceleration programs are a relatively new incubation mechanism in Portugal. Our 
analysis indicates that few startups are still unfamiliar with the programs format, 
mentioning that they “did not have many expectations” because they “did not really 
know the program in detail” (D). When asked about expectations, startup H argued: 
“At the time I had none. Everything was new so there weren't many expectations.” 
Notwithstanding, most participants had expectations about the outcomes of the 
program. “Financial support” (B) was a number one expectancy from ventures. 
Participants highlighted they were in need “to attract an investor” (E) and that they 
were interested in the “monetary prize” (H) the accelerator offered. Even though it was 
not the only reason why ventures applied for the program, “the expected funds from 
accelerators are also interesting” (J).  
A part from the financial compensation, participants were in the hope for accelerator’s 
support to structure and develop their business ideas. Startup F commented: “We 
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wanted to structure our ideas, designing the budget, the business plan and also the 
marketing plan”. 
G: “(...) to get some help from others in structuring our business, in helping it to grow.” 
I: “The business model and the unique value proposition had lacks.” 
Even though participants had a lot of technical knowledge about their products, the 
large majority had no background in business. Results suggest that these technical 
entrepreneurs rely on the accelerator’s business expertise in order to analyse and assess 
their ideas: “we knew that we would develop our business plan” (A). Startup J’s 
founder and CEO stated he “needed to realize how much the idea that was being 
developed was technically, and financially valid.” 
Concluding, our investigation suggests that inspite of its novelty, the entrepreneurial 
community is very much aware of the acceleration programs phenomenon. Few 
participants reported some unfamiliarity with the program, while the vast majority 
stated financial investment and business plan development as the two main 
motivations for applying to an acceleration program. 
 
2. Do ventures feel accelerated after the program? 
The second research question concerns the entrepreneurs’ perspective on the overall 
outcome of the acceleration program. We wanted to understand whether ventures 
actually felt they have learned and if the program met entrepreneurs’ previous 
expectations. Our results reveal that half of the participants consider that the program 
accelerated the development of the idea. We present the support evidences on the 
Appendix E: Evidence on the acceleration process outcomes. 
H: “If we hadn't participated, it would have taken more time to accomplish what we've 
accomplished so far... It accelerated the company.” 
J: “At an earlier stage, they have helped us to grow a lot (…)” 
We were able to find evidence of the impact of the accelerators on the development 
process of the participant startups. Ventures make a strong point on the increment they 
have received from the accelerator and how it has contributed to the evolution of their 
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projects “in a so short period of time” (E). Startup D’s founder and CEO reported that 
without the accelerator’s support: “it would take much longer to reach the level where 
we are today (…)”.  
Only two out of ten mentioned that the accelerator provided no relevant contribution 
to the development and progress of the venture. What is interesting though, is that the 
remaining participants did not give a concrete feedback on the topic meaning they 
might find it difficult to articulate the learning’s in such period of time. 
Nevertheless, few participants felt almost no impact, mentioning that the program had 
a “marginal the impact on the growth” (C). Venture F expressed some disappointment 
on the program’s structure: “I think that developing the business idea was a problem, 
the BGI program wasn’t quite helpful in that area.” 
 
3. Do accelerators have any impact on the drivers of startup success? 
If so, which are the most impacted ones? 
Extant research have studied factors that might be in the origin of startups success and 
how such factors can be predictors of the venture’s future performance. Several 
authors grouped the predictor variables in four categories – team, product, marketing 
and financials (MacMillan et al. 1985; Song et al. 2008, 2010). We follow the same 
methodology and our results were very conclusive. Evidence on the impact of the 
accelerator is clear in two of the four categories – Team and Marketing. Collected data 
of the accelerators’ impact on key drivers of startup success is minutely presented in 
the Appendix F: Evidence of the impact on the drivers of startup success. 
 
3.1. Team Credibility 
Team credibility is considered to be a crucial characteristic for startups that are seeking 
external investment (Feeser and Willard 1990). An investor is more willing to invest 
in an entrepreneur with a successful track record, rather than “shooting in the dark” by 
investing in an inexperienced entrepreneur (MacMillan et al. 1985).  
Our results indicate a positive impact of acceleration program mainly in two variables 




Accelerators promote an intensive indirect learning environment by connecting 
participants with experienced entrepreneurs and industry specialists. These people are 
invited to share their knowledge and experiences within the startup ecosystem and 
specific industries (Hallen et al. 2016). Our results suggest that participants attach 
great value to this knowledge-sharing experience. 
A: “During the bootcamps, BGI invited a lot of people with experience in the industry, 
and they interacted with the startups. It ended up to add a lot value (…).” 
D: “Mainly dealing with other startups operating in the same industry it’s possible to 
learn from each other which becomes a valuable aspect for the development of the 
idea.” 
Forty percent of our sample stated they have absorbed industry knowledge with the 
advices of others. Some even considered it was key to “validate our product” (G), 
while others acknowledge the importance of this program feature by considering that 
is during the direct contact with “people connected to the industry that we are 
developing” (J). 
Management 
Our sample reflects an acceleration program that attracts early-stage startups from the 
high-tech industry. Considering entrepreneurs’ high-level of technical expertise and 
low-level of business experience, most of the participants are considered to be 
technical entrepreneurs. Technical entrepreneurs have a profound scientific knowledge 
from their product, making it easy to develop a new feature or change any specific 
detail. Nonetheless, they do not have the necessary management skillset to analyse a 
given market potential, to conduct a financial analysis or even to marketing their 
product (Oakey 2003).  
From data analysis, it is notable the entrepreneurs’ evolution on management skills 
during the acceleration process. 
F: “I have learnt to apply business knowledge. How to assess the market, to penetrate 
it, how to validate and set up a business model.” 
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G: “It (the program) improved my management and perception skills when it comes 
to my team, my project, and my business and which direction to take.” 
Accelerators provide a curriculum in business, covering topics such as finance, law 
and marketing. These functional seminars are intended to mitigate the management 
skills gap from technical entrepreneurs (Cohen 2013). Participants reported they had 
tremendous evolution regarding management literacy and that they developed a much 
more profound “business sense”. Results indicates learning in “how to conduct a 
market analysis” (H), how to “validate a business” (F) by checking the idea feasibility 
and business profitability or even “what not do in a business” (F). 
 
3.2. Team Personality 
MacMillan et al. (1985) considers Team Personality an extremely relevant 
characteristic for ventures to overcome early-stage challenges. A team must be able to 
work well together and to communicate in a clear, objective and empathic format. 
These are fundamental preconditions for ventures to attract customers, investors or 
even to form partnerships with external entities (MacMillan et al. 1985). Results from 
our research indicates impact from accelerators in three drivers from the Team 
Personality category – Teamwork, Coachability and Communication.  
Coachability 
During the acceleration program, startups within the same cohort are impelled to 
network with each other and are constantly exposed to the advices and inputs from 
external guests and mentors (Cohen and Hocheberg 2014). This creates a knowledge-
sharing environment where participants are open to embody different perspectives and 
become more willing to exchange points-of-view.  
H: “At the time there were five mentors divided by all the companies. That gave a 
different perspective to the company and we learned a lot.” 
I: “(…) opinions from different backgrounds help you to shape your product.” 
Results from our research indicate that accelerators prepare teams to be much more 
prompt to listen and incorporate different perspectives, which will result in more 
coachable teams. Startup J commented: “(…) we made the most progress during the 
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exchange of experiences with other entrepreneurs and with people connected to the 
business world.” 
Teamwork 
Additionally, it is undeniable that the cohort effect has a remarkable impact on teams’ 
development. Several participants mentioned that teams were very close to each other 
and constantly incorporating the others’ best practices. 
I: “(…) knowing how they (cohort) work together was interesting. It is good for team 
development.” 
E: “Having the possibility to see what others are doing and what their results are or 
understand why they changed course is an advantage.” 
Accelerators create a group feeling within the cohort and startups end up supporting 
each other, strengthening bonds and learning what it means to be a team. Startup G 
explained: “we share ideas and questions with other start-ups because we can always 
benefit from other companies' strongest skills”. And even considering that ventures 
are fighting for resources, “teams ended up supporting each other” (A).  
Communication 
The majority of the acceleration programs end with a “demo day”, where startups 
present their ideas to a large audience of potential investors (Cohen 2013). Our 
findings suggest that participants indeed develop their communication skills during the 
program, and become much more proficient when presenting their business to a 
possible investor or customer.  
E: “The main benefit was guaranteed by the program approach that taught us how to 
make a pitch, which impacts an investor.” 
G: “We learned how to communicate, reach the client, how to reach the investor... that 
part was fundamental.” 
Participants outlined the effort taken by the accelerator and how they were “drilled” 
(G) during the bootcamps, in order to improve their pitches and communication skills. 
Startup H commented its first pitch was “really bad”, but with the cohort and 




Results were very conclusive and suggest that accelerators have a tremendous impact 
on ventures’ Team Personality. More specifically, the cohort effect promotes 
teamwork within each team, while the knowledge-sharing environment created by the 
accelerators motivates teams to be more prompt to listen others advices and to become 
more coachable. Additionally, it is clear that teams end up improving their 
communication skills.  
 
3.3. Marketing 
Previous research indicates that startup performance is clearly dependent from the 
market in which it intends to operate and how attractive it might be. Furthermore, a 
venture that disregards knowing its customers and developing a clear plan to reach 
them, has a higher probability of failure in an early stage (Calantone and Di Benedetto 
1988; Zhao et al. 2015). From our analysis, it is clear that accelerators have identified 
these preconditions and have created a top-notch support mechanism for marketing 
research and marketing plan development. The Marketing category is divided into 
three drivers of startup success and we found that were all accelerated by the program 
– Market Attractiveness, Customer Needs and Marketing Plan. 
Market Attractiveness 
A startup operating in an attractive market is much more prompt to achieve success 
(MacMillan et al. 1985; Song et al. 2008). Given the short time to market and the 
complexity of constantly re-building a product, accelerators induce a market-oriented 
mind-set to the participant ventures. Programs are designed to speed up market 
interactions in order to help new ventures to learn and adapt ideas as quickly as 
possible (Cohen and Hochberg 2014). Our analysis suggests that rather than changing 
the product to address a pre-defined market, accelerators firstly focus on finding an 
attractive market and then in making minor changes on the product if needed.  
D: “With the accelerator we were directed to do a profound analysis of the marketplace 
in order to assess if it was the market and industry we wanted (...) We started by 
validating the market of high-performance sailing, cargo ships and wind blades which 
at the moment is the market that we are more focused on.” 
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F: “I think that one of the most important things we learned (...) is the fact that, since 
our technology can be used in a wide scope of areas, we must focus only in one 
direction. We have to find one market, very narrow, focus and precise and we must 
know for sure that the direction is profitable.” 
Ventures are impelled to develop a market-oriented attitude and to think 
internationally, always focusing first on the market they want to address. Participants 
have acknowledged the accelerator’s impact on finding an attractive market. Startup 
G’s founder highlighted the impact: “It (the program) made us understand that the 
project could be bigger, (…) and made us think global and that was super interesting”. 
“How to internationalize” or “how to think out-of-the-box” (H), are also regarded as 
paramount lessons-learned by the entrepreneurs. Some even describe this support as 
“one of the most important things we learned” (F) and that learning how to evaluate 
and access a market “were the benefits of the program” (H). 
Customer Needs 
Our research reveals that after finding an attractive market, accelerators promote 
startups’ interaction with potential customers in order to understand their needs and 
tailor their offer accordingly. Literature argues that in order to achieve success, a 
startup should understand the market and build a product that meets customer needs in 
a superior way (Calantone and Di Benedetto 1988; Henard and Szymanski 2001). 
D: “(…) definitely the meetings with client we learned a lot because it was possible to 
hear their real problems in first hand” 
I: “Market feedback was good as we were able to meet with charities and fund raisers 
in the US and they taught us how we could make our product work in the US.” 
Given the short program’s duration, accelerators try to stimulate partners and 
customers procurement activities as soon as possible (Pauwels et al. 2016). Ventures 
are supposed to focus first in the market requirements and then in any technical 
modification in the product. It is clear from our research that one of the program’s 
major benefits is to offer to these technical entrepreneurs with the possibility to interact 
with markets and possible customers on a regular basis. The provided market feedback 
is fundamental for ventures to further develop its value proposition and to know where 
they should concentrate their efforts and investments. Entrepreneurs commented they 
36 
 
have developed a much more market oriented mind-set after the program: “It (the 
program) taught me to listen to clients more rather than trying to make a sale (…)” 
(G). 
Marketing Plan 
Literature have long emphasized the importance for new ventures to develop a 
minutely marketing plan in order to penetrate the market, attract customers and to pre-
empt competitive forces from undesirable offensives (Song et al. 2010). Accelerators 
attempt to mitigate possible gaps by providing knowledgeable support on the market 
development process (Hallen et al. 2016). Findings from our research indicate that 
accelerators promote a plethora of market-oriented activities in order to speed-up 
ventures’ interactions with the market. These activities normally include client 
meetings, debates about market penetration strategies or even discussions with market 
specialists.  
H: “In our year, we had an intensive week at MIT and it was truly an eye-opener for 
us and taught us how to address the market.” 
D: “With the help of mentors, we also managed to define our go-to-market plan that is 
extremely useful to introduce the company to a potential customer or investor.” 
Upon a pragmatic and objective picture of the business and the steps needed to address 
the market, accelerators have developed the so called “go-to-market plan” (Cohen 
2013). It is not a business plan but rather a step-by-step plan to reach the market as fast 
as possible by spending as little as possible. It aims to answer questions such as “What 
are we going to do? How are we going to do it? What are the resources? And in what 
way?” (G). Even though sometimes ventures refer to it as “business plan”, it is not. 
This plan is “fully designed for entering the markets” (G) and considered to be 
“extremely useful to introduce the company to a potential customer” (D).  
Bearing in mind the results, our investigation corroborates past literature and presents 
undoubtedly proves that accelerators are active supporters in the market research and 
development processes. We found that participants attach great value to this early 
network with customers and recognize the importance of developing a concrete and 
step-by-step plan to turn ideas into reality. Startup E recognized the impact, by 
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referring that: “Before the program, we had only one idea on paper and university 
investigation were done. Nothing else.” 
 
4. Discussion 
We interviewed a sample of ten accelerated startups and after a careful analysis of the 
transcript records, we found some interesting results. 
Ventures’ Expectations 
First, regarding the reasons to participate we concluded that the majority of the startups 
seek financial investment and business development support. Not surprisingly, 
ventures found very appealing the monetary prize and the possibility of receiving an 
up-front investment on the “Demo Day”. Besides the financial compensation, 
participants attach enormous expectations on the accelerator’s support to further 
develop their business ideas. The large majority of the startup teams are composed by 
technical entrepreneurs, with no background and experience in business. Bearing in 
mind that acceleration programs promise fast market interactions within a three 
months’ program (Cohen and Hochberg 2014), ventures expect an exceptional support 
from the accelerator’s network to develop the business side of their value propositions. 
However, evidence suggests that some entrepreneurs were still unfamiliar with the 
program when they got accepted. In these cases, no expectations are settled by 
participants. A possible explanation for this unawareness, may be the fact that 
accelerators are a relatively new incubation model in the Portuguese landscape.   
Program’s Impact 
Second, trying to understand whether the program was impactful, ventures opinions 
were less consensual. Although the majority of the participants felt accelerated during 
the program, others felt disappointed with the outcomes. We found intriguing that 
participants have opposite perspectives about the same acceleration program.  
Where does the learning take place? 
Third, we found strong evidence that accelerators are skilful Team Builders and 
Market Development Champions for high-tech startups. The program enabled 
ventures to develop key drivers of success in two main areas – Team and Marketing. 
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A lower impact on the Product and Financials’ dimensions seems to emerge from our 
analysis. It is clear though, that some specifications of this new incubation model, have 
remarkable impact on ventures’ early steps.  
Team Builders 
From our research, we found that acceleration programs have a very relevant impact 
on ventures’ horse race (market). Surprisingly, our results suggest that accelerators are 
also responsible for remarkable changes on jockeys’ (teams) behaviours and skills. 
First, the program improve Teams’ Credibility, meaning that teams develop a more 
solid background on business and on the industry they operate in. Secondly and very 
interesting, we found a positive impact from the program on how teams work, listen 
to others and express themselves, on Team’s Personality. 
Team Personality: Coachability, Communication Skills and Teamwork 
First, accelerators create a knowledge-sharing environment, stimulating teams to 
become more open-minded and coachable. Teams are constantly in-touch with a large 
network of mentors, experienced entrepreneurs and managers. They advise 
participants on major business decisions during the process (Hallen et al. 2016). This 
knowledge-sharing environment improve teams’ ability to embody the advices of 
others causing teams to be more coachable after the program. 
Second, interviews suggest that a strong effort is made by accelerators to improve 
Teams’ communication and presentation skillset. Almost every startup reported 
progress in their ability to pitch and present to investors and customers. This was 
mainly achieve through the demanding bootcamps.  
Third, we found the cohort effect to have a positive impact on ventures’ Teamwork 
skills. The fact that startups participate within a cohort, creates a feeling of group 
belonging where teams end up learning and developing together. During the process, 
ventures tend to incorporate other teams’ best practices, improving their own ability 






Team Credibility: Industry Knowledge and Management Skills 
Our investigation detected a positive impact from accelerators on Teams’ Credibility. 
More specifically, we found that accelerators improve participants’ Industry 
Knowledge and Management capabilities during the program.  
Indirect learning has been referred as an important process towards learning and one 
of the key strategies adopted by accelerators to speed-up the ventures’ learning process 
(Hallen et al. 2016). To this end, industry specialists are invited to further nurture the 
startups’ development with knowledgeable advices. This knowledge is transferred to 
participants that get acquainted with their specific industry dynamics during the 
program, suggesting that entrepreneurs end up learning from their advisors’ 
experiences.  
In addition, entrepreneurs also reported strong development on Management skills and 
competences. Our analysis indicates that due to its format, acceleration programs 
prepare participants to take much more thoughtful managerial decisions after 
graduation takes place. Entrepreneurs reported feeling more proficient when analysing 
a market and more apt to understand the requirements to build a viable business model. 
Market Development Champions 
Lastly, our results show that accelerators are Market Development Champions for 
participant startups. More specifically, we found that accelerators offer valuable 
support in finding an Attractive Market, developing a Marketing Plan and tailoring 
ventures’ value proposition to meet Customer Needs. However, we found intriguing 
that the direct impact of accelerators on ventures’ Product is marginal. After a careful 
analysis of the conducted interviews and previous literature on the topic, we came up 
to some interesting conclusions.  
Marketing: Market Attractiveness, Customer Needs and Marketing Plan 
We found that rather than promoting dramatically changes on the product, accelerators 
are more likely to have an impactful role on startups’ marketing development process. 
Time seems to emerge as a key explanation to this phenomenon. Scholars have long 
emphasized the positive relation between first product differentiation and startups’ 
early success (Schoonhoven et al. 1990). However, it is argued that building product 
differentiation, entails more complexity on the development process, which ultimately 
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leads to a delay on the time needed to get a product ready to sell in the market (Zhao 
et al. 2015). From the selection to graduation phase, the acceleration process takes 
roughly three months. Reasonably, accelerators do not have the time and technical 
resources to support a complex product development process for every single startup. 
Instead, they design a program that fosters ventures’ interaction with the market, 
impelling participants to learn and adapt ideas in a fast-paced manner (Cohen and 
Hochberg 2014).  
Our research indicates that market development support is the first step for future 
product development (or pivot). After selecting an attractive market, accelerators 
introduce possible clients to startups. The obtained feedback, empower entrepreneurs 
to perform necessary adjustments on the product in order to meet customer 
requirements. At the same time, ventures receive monitoring while developing their 
“go-to-market plan”. Supported by mentors and the accelerator’s body, ventures 
develop a step-by-step plan to penetrate the market, reach customers and attract 
financial resources. 
Concluding, we found accelerators to be outstanding Market Development 
Champions, causing a positive impact on the Market Attractiveness, Customer Needs 
and Marketing Plan drivers for startup success.   
Financials 
Even though some participants mentioned the impact of the accelerator on the 
development of the “business plan”, almost no entrepreneur detailed developments on 
the financial plan. Bearing in mind that ventures have to present their projects at the 
end of the program, it is expected some support from accelerators on the financial 
projections of the business plan. Nevertheless, our results cannot sustain any 
substantial conclusion of a clear impact from the acceleration program on the 







CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
1. Conclusions 
Accelerators are here to stay. From more than one decade now, accelerators offer a 
new incubation mechanism for entrepreneurs to develop their ideas in a fast and 
effective way (Cohen 2013). Scholars have investigated how acceleration programs 
are built and how they differ from older incubation models (Pauwels et al. 2016). 
However, little research exists on the actual impact of accelerators in early-stage 
ventures. Bearing in mind the little academic contribution on this field, we decided to 
analyse what, if something, is in fact accelerated by the program and how does it 
impacts participants’ learning. We conducted ten interviews with accelerated ventures 
in order to access the entrepreneurs’ perspective on the subject and we discover that 
accelerators have an extremely relevant impact on ventures’ early steps. More 
specifically, we found accelerators to be incredible Team Builders and Market 
Development Champions for participant startups. 
1.1. Managerial Implications 
First, we provide a framework of analysis that startups can use in order to access their 
ideas and likelihood of success. The presented key drivers for startup success (Team; 
Product; Marketing; Financials) are based on acknowledged research (MacMillan et 
al. 1985; Song et al. 2008) and can be applied for any startup in any industry. 
Furthermore, we prove that accelerators have major impact on the Team and 
Marketing development processes, suggesting that entrepreneurs should have a clear 
idea of their Product and should not expect for accelerators to make huge 
transformations on its performance. Accelerators are market enablers, not product 
developers. Interestingly, this dissertation also sheds light to the impact that 
accelerators have on startup Teams. Several authors have studied the importance of 
Teams on startups’ future success (MacMillan et al. 1985; Colombo and Grilli 2010; 
Zhao et al. 2015), yet, little is known on how does the acceleration program affected 
Teams’ learning and skills. The present dissertation highlight the enormous impact of 
the program on Management, Industry, Communication, Coachability and 
Communication Team skills.  
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Secondly, accelerators can retrieve some interesting data from our research. 
Concerning the selection phase, accelerators should look deeper into the startup profile 
in order to understand if there is a match between what the startup wants and needs, 
and compare it with what the accelerator has to offer. For instance, coachable teams 
are more likely to take advantage from accelerators’ network of advisors, while 
startups without a concrete and developed product might not be able take the most 
benefit from the market development support. Additionally, our research also provide 
several insights for other incubation models that aim to adapt their strategies. We saw 
the cohort effect and the knowledge-sharing environment to have major impacts on 
teams. Business incubators and venture capitalists can incorporate some of these 
practices if they want to achieve similar results. 
1.2. Theoretical Implications 
Extant research focused on analysing the differences between accelerators and 
previous incubation models (Pauwels et al. 2016), however, theory lacks a common 
understanding on “how” and “why” accelerators impacts startups trajectories (Cohen 
and Hochberg 2014). Few investigators have studied the results of being accelerated 
(Smith and Hannigan 2015), but still little is known on the reasons that ultimately lead 
to those results. We have analysed what is the impact of accelerators on the key drivers 
for startup success and reached to some interesting conclusions. To begin with, our 
investigation corroborates previous research by proving that accelerators in fact offer 
a top-notch support on marketing research and development activities (Hallen et al. 
2016). Interestingly, we also provide some insights on how accelerators are able to 
transform teams’ characteristics. We found that due to its structure, accelerators end 
up changing teams’ Personality and Credibility, meaning that accelerators can add life-
long contributions for teams who participate in the program. 
 
2. Limitations and Future Research 
The present work also presents some limitations. First, we conducted a multiple case-
study through interviews analysis, suggesting that interpretation can possibly have a 
word to say on our final results. Through this research method, both the interviewer 
and interviewee can manipulate data unintentionally, just because the interpretation of 
words is in most of the times complex and difficult to perform, in other words, word 
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meanings and interpretations are always affected by the people involved. Second, we 
focused our analysis on ten accelerated startups from only one Portuguese accelerator. 
Due to our limited time and resources, we were only able to collect ten observations, 
which is considered to be a relatively small sample. Moreover, our results did not 
control some important variables such as geography or startups’ demographics, so 
generalization loses power. To overcome such limitations, future research should 
include a larger sample of startups accelerators, from different geographies, and should 
amplify the number of observations.  
We found that not all the participants recognized added-value from the program. We 
propose future research to look deeper on the “why” of these contrasting opinions. 
Possible interpretations can rely on the accelerators’ industry specialization strategy 
or on the entrepreneurs’ commitment to the program. Literature suggests that several 
accelerators have become more industry specialized over time (Pauwels et al. 2016). 
Our research, indicates that participants perceive their business specifications as 
possible explanations for the program’s marginal impact.  
C: “My company is hardware based so the business is very different from software or 
the medical devices or these type of companies. The accelerator has a lot of different 
companies but normally they are only software.” 
F: “But, on the other hand, I also understand that there are so many different businesses 
and so many different areas, that it would be very difficult for them to have a mentor 
who knows exactly the area you want to pursue and help you in that same area.” 
Additionally, participants’ engagement and openness to the program can possibly have 
a word to say on the perceived program’s impact. We believe that future research 
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Appendix B: Interview Guide 
1. SECTION ONE - ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS  
a. Why did you join the accelerator?  
b. What were the benefits/value you received?  
c. How was the program different from your expectations?  
d. Can you share with me the stages of the program?  
e. When do you think your firm made the most progress? Why?  
f. Can you recall any events or moments in which you have learnt something important in the 
program? Can you tell me more about it?  
g. How significant was this event to the future development of your business?  
h. How do you think the program’s length affected what you got out of the program?  
2. SECTION TWO - INTERACTION BETWEEN THE STARTUPS AND THE 
ACCELERATOR AND HOW IT SUPPORTS ENTREPRENEURIAL LEARNING  
a. What was the relationship of your venture with the accelerator? What kind of support did 
you receive?  
b. How did it help you grow? And in what sense?  
c. Would you have grown in the same way without the accelerator? If so, why?  
d. Was it different for other Startups or was it the same for the rest of the cohort? If so, why?  
3. SECTION THREE - INTERACTION AT THE COHORT LEVEL  
a. How did you interact with your cohort?  
b. How useful it was to be part of a cohort within the program?  
c. What did you learn from them? Do you think being part of a cohort affected your firm’s 
development? How?  
4. DEMOGRAPHICS  
a. Education  
b. Prior employment (industry)  
c. Prior ventures  
d. Location of Startup  
e. Team Size  
f. Number of co-founders  
g. Co-founds background education  
h. Startup age (at entry-time)  
i. What stage was your product at the time you applied? (idea, prototype, Beta, live, revenue)  
j. Number of people currently employed by the venture 
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Appendix C: Ventures Demographics 











Co-founders Education Prior Ventures
A Health Portugal 5th Not born 18 months 3 10 Prototype - No
B Health England 4th 2 years 6 years 5 5 Idea












F Logistics Portugal 6th 1 year 2 years 2 2 Prototype






Portugal 6th 1,5 years 3 years 3 3 Revenue














Portugal 2nd Not born 5 years 4 15 Idea - No
YesPrototype
All of them (3) were from 
Computer Science and 
Researchers before the 
venture






1st Not born 7 years 3 42
48 Idea
Marketing Degree No
E Internet 3th 3 months 4 years 4
2 2 Prototype3 yearsD
Sea 
Transport
6th 1 year 
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Appendix D: Evidence on Expectations 
Appendix D.1: Secure Financial Investment 
Secure Financial Investment 
B: “(Why BGI?) (…) the main reason was financial support” 
C: “(...) we are targeting fundraising on international level.” 
E: “(Why BGI?) We needed to attract an investor.” 
H: “(…) BGI that had a monetary prize and an international couching. That's why we 
opted for BGI.” 
I: “(Why BGI?) (…) we were in need for funding and for networking with investors.” 
J: “The expected funds from accelerators are also interesting (…).” 
 
Appendix D.2: Structure Ideas and Develop the Business Plan 
Structure Ideas and Develop the Business Plan 
A: “(…) we knew that we would develop our business plan” 
C: “My expectations were based what I already knew about Ycombinator program and 
I was expecting something similar.” 
F: “(Why BGI?) We wanted to structure our ideas, designing the budget, the business 
plan and also the marketing plan” 
G: “(Why BGI?) (...) to get some help from others in structuring our business, in 
helping it to grow.” 
I: “(Why BGI?). The business model and the unique value proposition had lacks.” 
J: “(Why BGI?) (…) needed to realize how much an idea/project that was being 





Appendix D.3: Do not know 
Do not know 
D: “I didn’t have many expectations because we did not really know the program in 
detail.” 
G: “We didn't even know what we could gain from this (…)” 
H: “(Expectations?) At the time I had none. Everything was new so there weren't many 
expectations.” 
 
Appendix E: Evidence on the acceleration process outcomes 
Appendix E.1: Ventures feel Accelerated 
Ventures feel Accelerated 
A: “We were always learning with the other that made us jump some stages.” 
D: “Also certainly it would take much longer to reach the level where we are today 
because it would be much more difficult to get valuable contacts or even enrich our 
value proposition without BGI’s support.” 
E: “I will not say that there wasn’t the opportunity to get be at this point without the 
program but would not have been in a so short period of time.” 
H: “If we hadn't participated, it would have taken more time to accomplish what we've 
accomplished so far... It accelerated the company.” 
J: “At an earlier stage, they have helped us to grow a lot, and they still help us 
nowadays.” 
 
Appendix E.2: Ventures do not feel Accelerated 
Ventures do not feel accelerated 
C: “It was marginal the impact on the growth. And sometimes it was even confusing 
and could be called “desacceleration”.” 
F: “I think that developing the business idea was a problem, the BGI program wasn’t 
quite helpful in that area.” 
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Appendix F: Evidence of the impact on the drivers of startup success 
Appendix F.1: Industry Knowledge 
Industry Knowledge 
A: “During the bootcamps, BGI invited a lot of people with experience in the industry, 
and they interacted with the startups. It ended up to add a lot value to our venture (…)” 
D: “(About the program) Mainly dealing with other startups operating in the same 
industry it’s possible to learn from each other which becomes a valuable aspect for the 
development of the idea.” 
G: “(About going to Boston and New York) This was an interesting experience to 
understand the American context and be able to validate our product. We spoke to 
many companies with similar products, spoke with many mentors who have gone 
through the whole cycle more than once.” 
J: “(...) it is during direct contact with others Entrepreneurs, and people connected to 
the industry that we are developing.” 
 
Appendix F.2: Management 
Management 
B: “I have learnt to apply business knowledge. How to assess the market, to penetrate 
it, how to validate and set up a business model. The co-founders gained a lot of 
business knowledge since they had no idea about it before.” 
F: “To sum up, I learned “to what do not do in a business”, basically I learned how to 
validate properly a business. When I say to validate a business, I mean firstly to check 
if an idea is feasible, if there is a possibility to make any profit, to see how you will 
sell it and to whom.” 
G: “(About the program) It improved my management and perception skills when it 
comes to my team, my project, and my business and which direction to take.” 
H: "I learned how to communicate, how to conduct a market analysis and everything 




Appendix F.3: Teamwork 
Teamwork 
A: “The environment created by the accelerator promoted the interaction between 
teams. Being somehow competitors, the teams ended up by supporting each other. (...) 
Sharing our experiences and when it's possible to help other teams with our 
experiences, we do it.” 
E: “I think when you have no experience in a particular area namely in the business 
area, then all that you can learn by doing almost bench marketing with others is useful. 
Having the possibility to see what others are doing and what their results are or 
understand why they changed course is an advantage.” 
G: “(Cohorts impact?) Up until now, we share ideas and questions with other start-ups 
because we can always benefit from other companies' strongest skills.” 
I: “(…) knowing how they (cohort) work together was interesting. It is good for team 
development.” 
 
Appendix F.4: Coachability 
Coachability 
A: “We were in touch with people that went through the same thing, and maybe they 
even participated in the BGI program, that came to leave their testimony and explain 
the difficulties they were a having in the process. We were always learning with the 
other that made us jump some stages. We were basically learning with others' 
mistakes.” 
H: “At the time there were five mentors divided by all the companies. That gave a 
different perspective to the company and we learned a lot. That was one of the biggest 
benefits.” 
I: “(…) opinions from different backgrounds help you to shape your product.” 
J: “I think, we made the most progress during the exchange of experiences with other 




Appendix F.5: Communication 
Communication 
C: “(The major progress?) It was on refining the pitch, the bootcamp was interesting 
for refining the pitch.” 
E: “The main benefit was guaranteed by the program approach that taught us how to 
make a pitch, which impacts an investor.” 
G: “(Benefits?) Impact in our organization, way of working and communicate, yes 
(…) how to communicate, reach the client, how to reach the investor... that part was 
fundamental.” 
H: “My first pitch was really bad. After that, with the group's help, the teachers... 
everything... helped me improve. The last pitch was really good, so good that we ended 
up winning the prize.” 
J: “We learnt how we should format our presentation (...) Therefore, it was essential 
not only to our own development, but also to understand how we can seek investment 
and how to attract investors.” 
 
Appendix F.6: Market Attractiveness 
Market Attractiveness 
D: “With the accelerator we were directed to do a profound analysis of the marketplace 
in order to assess if it was the market and industry we wanted (...) We started by 
validating the market of high-performance sailing, cargo ships and wind blades which 
at the moment is the market that we are more focused on.” 
F: “I think that one of the most important things we learned (...) is the fact that, since 
our technology can be used in a wide scope of areas, we must focus only in one 
direction. We have to find one market, very narrow, focus and precise and we must 
know for sure that the direction is profitable.” 
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G: “We developed a more global and international perspective for the project. It made 
us understand that the project could be bigger (…) It opened our horizons and made 
us think global and that was super interesting.” 
H: “But truly the week in Boston gave us... How to open a company in the United 
States, how to internationalize, how to think out of the box. Those were the benefits of 
the program.” 
 
Appendix F.7: Customer Needs 
Customer Needs 
D: “(…) definitely the meetings with client we learned a lot because it was possible to 
hear their real problems in first hand” 
G: “It (the program) taught me to listen to clients more rather than trying to make a 
sale (…)” 
I: “Market feedback was good as we were able to meet with charities and fund raisers 
in the US and they taught us how we could make our product work in the US.” 
 
Appendix F.8: Marketing Plan 
Marketing Plan 
D: “With the help of mentors, we also managed to define our go-to-market plan that is 
extremely useful to introduce the company to a potential customer or investor” 
E: “We had to elaborate the business plan and answer questions from mentors in order 
to ensure that it was well done. I think is the great benefit of this program is the 
mentoring received. Before the program, we had only one idea on paper and university 
investigation were done. Nothing else.” 
F: “They (mentors) said that our technology can be used in these different areas, so we 
must clearly focus in one unique application (...) several people told us clearly: “You 




G: “We did a go-to-market plan. Something simpler than a business plan, but fully 
designed for entering the markets. What are going to do? How are we going to do it? 
What are the resources? And in what way?” 
H: “In our year, we had an intensive week at MIT and it was truly an eye-opener for 
us and taught us how to address the market.” 
 
 
 
